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Introduction
There is an increasing reliance on private security contractors throughout 
the world. Already private security guards far outnumber uniformed police 
officers in many countries. In Latin America, for example, the ratio of private 
security guards to police officers is 6.7 to 1 in Guatemala and 4.9 to 1 in Brazil.1 
There are indications that military personnel will to some degree be replaced by 
private contractors in several countries. In Argentina for example, the guards at 
the airports will be privatized rather than rely on the previous Air Force police. 
And, I know from requests I receive to discuss contracting out security from 
governments including Brazil, Nepal, and Portugal, that there is interest in the 
issue of contracting out security more generally. No country has gone further in 
contracting out security than the United States. While both government officials 
and scholars have repeatedly highlighted problems in contracting out security, 
these problems continue. I will draw upon the lessons I have learned from the 
US experience, particularly in Iraq, to draw what amounts to a cautionary tale 
regarding the use of private security contractors. The focus here is on private 
security contractors, those who carry weapons and most closely approximate the 
traditional roles of the uniformed military. More will be explained on these roles 
in the paper. This paper is based on data to which anyone energetic and interested 
can have access, largely from public and official US Government sources, my own 
research that included eight research trips to Washington, D.C. between 2009 
and 2014, and which resulted in Anonymous. 
* Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA (tbruneau@nps.edu).
1 Organization of American States, Report on Citizen Security in the Americas 2012 (2012) Washington, DC: 
OAS Hemispheric Security Observatory, p. 139. 




























That the US is the world leader in the use of contractors can be seen in the 














Figure 1. Geographical distribution of private security contractors.
The same data, displayed in Figure 2 shows that it is also as post-Cold War 




















Figure 2. Founding of private security contractors.
2 Dew, Nicholas and Bryan Hudgens (2008). The Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey, 21-22. Published 
in http://www.acquisitionresearch.org, p. 9. The data is derived from a survey sent to 550 private contracting firms. 
3 Dew and Hudgens (2008, 8). 
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But, that the use of contractors is an important phenomenon, there can be no 
doubt for in 2008 there were 190,000 contractors in the Iraq Theater compared 
to 200,000 uniformed military personnel.4
Despite the lack of reference to contractors in official documents and the 
main-line press, the use of private contractors continues today as an important 
phenomenon as is indicated by the fact that even after the departure of US 
troops from Iraq in December 2011, there still remained almost 11,000 private 
contractors.5 As a very respectable scholar researching and publishing on contracting 
out security states in a recent article. “…when the US withdrew its troops from 
Iraq in December 2011, the State Department sent in 5500 private security 
contractors to protect the embassy and American diplomatic interests there. To set 
this number in context, consider that it is roughly double the number of security 
contractors working for the State Department in Iraq prior to the withdrawal.”6 
Even more telling, despite the lack of public attention in the current return by 
the US to fight the Islamic State in Iraq, the US Army Contracting Command 
published a “Sources Sought” in August 2014 for Security Assistance Mentors 
and Advisors Services in Iraq to “…focus on core process and systems which 
involve, but are not limited to administration, force development, procurement 
and acquisition, contracting, training management, public affairs, logistics, 
personnel management, professional development, communications, planning and 
operations, infrastructure management, intelligence and executive development.”7
In sum, contracting out security remains a central characteristic of how the 
US operates, in combat and in general. To put the issue in perspective, as stated 
in a recent official report: “The Department of Defense (DOD) relies extensively 
on contractors to equip and support the US military in peacetime and during 
military operations, obligating more than US$ 300 billion in contracts in FY 
2013.”8 To put this figure in perspective, the estimated total budget for DOD 
was US$ 613.9 billion in FY 2013.9
4 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), (2008) Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq Washington, DC: 
CBO, p. 13.
5 Schwartz, Moshe and Jennifer Church, (2013) Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military 
Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service, p. 25. “Table A-2. 
Contractor Personnel and Troop Level in Iraq.” These included private security contactors and others. 
6 Dunigan, Molly (2014) The future of US military contracting: Current trends and future implications, 
International Journal Published online. 
7 Federal Business Opportunities, Solicitation Number – W560MY-14-R-004. https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=
opportunity&mode=form&id=2eec28ef1768665f2a6310916c50dff9&tab=core&_cview=0 accessed September 
30, 2014. Emphasis added.
8 Schwartz, Moshe (2014) Summary “Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis and Issues for 
Congress” CRS Report for Congress.
9 For data on the overall DOD budget see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) “National 
Defense Budget Estimated for FY 2013” available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2013/FY13_Green_Book.pdf accessed January 22, 2015.



























The focus in this paper is on the PSCs because they are armed, thus most 
closely approximating what military personnel have done in the US in the past 
and what most armed forces in other countries do today. Since they are armed it 
is not surprising that the US Congress, have paid a great deal of attention to the 
PSCs. This focus is captured in the title of SEC. 862 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181 (5 December 
2007): “Contractors Performing Private Security Functions in Areas of Combat 
Operations”.10 The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), 
which was founded by the US Congress in 2004 to audit the use of public funds in 
Iraq, published a “Comprehensive Plan for Audits of Private Security Contractors 
to Meet the Requirements of Section 842 of Public Law 110-181,” updated on 8 
May 2009, which provides detailed information on the PSCs and the audits and 
other studies being conducted on them.11 Moreover, the main focus at the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Assistant Deputy Under Secretary (Logistics 
& Material Readiness/Program Support) is on implementing the guidance of 
Section 862.
As of 16 October 2008, SIGIR had identified seventy-seven individual PSC 
companies that provided security services to US agencies working in Iraq since 
2003. In a May 2009 update of the report, SIGIR identified another sixteen, 
bringing the total to ninety-three companies that have provided physical security 
services in Iraq. The report estimates that since the war’s inception in 2003 until 
early 2009, Department of Defense, Department of State, and United States 
Agency for International Development had spent US$ 5.9 billion on contracts 
and subcontracts for PSCs. In interviews at SIGIR officials emphasized that the 
PSCs are extremely important in the overall reconstruction effort, and would likely 
become even more important as US forces withdrew, first from the major cities 
and finally from the country at the end of 2011.12 Considering the data provided 
above from Molly Dunigan on the 5,500 private security contractors remaining 
in Iraq after the departure of US troops, they were accurate. 
A later SIGIR Report to Congress, in 2009, estimated that there were 25,500 
private security personnel under contact in Iraq.13 SIGIR does not claim to have 
developed a precise definition of just what is a PSC. However, several federal 
agencies, including SIGIR, define a PSC in terms of the following four tasks or 
functions: 
10 Contractor Performing Functions in Areas of Combat Operations, (2007) SEC. 862 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181. 
11 Bowen, Stuart and David R. Warren (2009) Comprehensive Plan for Audits of Private Security Contractors 
to Meet the Requirements of Section 842 of Public Law 110-181, SIGIR. 
12 Author interviews at SIGIR with the Deputy Director, the Assistant Inspector General for Audits, and several 
auditors, Arlington, Virginia, 26 February and 16 June 2009. 
13 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress October 30, 2009, reports that as of September 30, 
2009 there are 25,500 private security contractors in Iraq. There were, at the same time, 120,000 US forces. p. 47. 
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•   Static Security: protect fixed or static sites, such as housing areas, 
reconstruction work sites, or government buildings.
•   Convoy Security: protect convoys traveling in Afghanistan and Iraq.
•   Security Escorts: protect individuals traveling in unsecured areas in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
•   Personal Security Details – provide protective security to high-ranking 
individuals.
While these particular tasks or functions may not be associated with what are 
often referred to as “trigger pullers,” they were previously carried out by personnel 
who were part of the highly-regulated, civilian-controlled military structure that 
I have described elsewhere.14 That is, they are the closest to the military in terms 
of being armed and protecting people, things, and places. 
The motivations to contract out
There are several “drivers” or justifications for the contracting out 
phenomenon in the US. Some of these may apply in other countries. Relying on 
official sources, the following have been identified as the most important.15 
First, an authoritative source to establish a baseline description of the 
general context for contacting out is the testimony of David M. Walker, then US 
Comptroller General, to the House Subcommittee on Readiness in March 2008. 
Walker offered a list of the factors that led federal agencies to outsource more and 
more services: 
…limitations on the number of authorized full-time equivalent positions; 
unavailability of certain capabilities and expertise among federal employees; 
desire for operational flexibility; and the need for “surge” capacity. According 
to DOD and armed service official, several factors have contributed to 
the department’s increased use of contractors for support services: (1) the 
increased requirements associated with the Global War on Terrorism and other 
contingencies; (2) policy to rely on the private sector for needed commercial 
services that are not inherently governmental in nature; and (3) DOD 
initiatives, such as competitive sourcing and utility privatization programs.16 
These are ongoing and long-term motivations.
Second, with the all-volunteer force, private security contractors are thought 
by informed experts to be necessary. At the end of the Cold War, the US Army 
14 Specifically in Anonymous. 
15 Dew and Hudgens (2008) pp. 44-50. Singer, P.W. (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized 
Military Industry Ithaca: Cornell University Press, dedicates a chapter to this topic, 4, “Why Security Has Been 
Privatized”, pp. 49-70.
16 Walker, David M. (2008) Comptroller General of the United States, Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-08-572T: 4-5.



























went from 732,000 active personnel in 1990 to 408,000 in 1997; for the three 
services, including the Marines, the numbers were 2,043,705 in 1990, to 1,438,562 
in 1997. As of August 2009, with two wars waging, the size of the US Army stood 
at 552,425.17 A number of contractor proponents highlighted to me the personnel 
shortage to explain the growth of the PSCs. 
Third, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2001–2006) wanted to 
demonstrate that the Iraq invasion and pacification could be accomplished with a 
lean force, and that technology would be a sufficient force multiplier. Such a success 
would justify his policies promoting defense “transformation” over a traditional 
build-up of forces, policies that were encouraged by Rumsfeld and others in the 
George W. Bush Administration. As Richard N. Haass states, the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 was a “war of choice” rather than of necessity as its proponents claimed.18 
Whereas the United States deployed 500, 000 troops in the 1991 war against Iraq, 
in line with the Powell Doctrine premise of using overwhelming force to achieve 
a clear goal, the 2003 invasion kept troop levels to about 150,000. General Eric 
Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, disagreed with this policy while being questioned 
before Congress. Shortly thereafter Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced 
Shinseki’s replacement, about eighteen months before his scheduled retirement. 
Rumsfeld ignored military advice, and other military leaders did not push back.19 
In interviews, security contractors emphasize the security vacuum that they have 
been employed to fill, but the vacuum appears to be a result of deliberate policy 
rather than exigency.
In sum, there are at least three major reasons for the growth in contracting in 
general, and security in particular, as demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 
above. The result was chaotic as Secretary Rumsfeld’s successor, Robert M. Gates, 
would write. “As the contractor presence developed in Iraq after the original 
invasion, there was no plan, no structure, no oversight, and no coordination. 
The contractors’ role grew willy-nilly as each US department or agency contracted 
with them independently, their number eventually climbing to some 150,000.”20 
While other countries’ armed forces may not be engaged in combat as are 
US forces, there is still a strong appeal to the logic of contracting out. In theory, 
at least, contractors should be cheaper than professional military personnel in that 
17 The data for 1990 is from “Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1990,” (AD-A235 849), issued by 
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense. 
Data for 1997 and 2009 are found at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/tab9 
18 Haass, Richard N. (2009) War of Necessity War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars New York: Simon 
& Schuster. 
19 Richard Haass refers to “…the effective silencing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld.”. Haass, War of Necessity, pp. 18-19. This key point has been dealt with extensively in credible sources. 
Joseph Collins lists ten “Errors in Decisionmaking and Execution,” of which eight concern lack of manpower. 
See Collins, Joseph J. (2008) Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath, Occasional Paper, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, p. 16.
20 Gates, Robert (2014) Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 224. 
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they can be let go when there is no longer a need for them, and none of the 
additional costs, such as health benefits, dependents’ allowances, pensions, and 
the like are required.21 It is important to stress that it is mainly for these theoretical 
reasons that contracting out is strongly encouraged in the US not only under 
Republican but also Democratic administrations. 
Contracting out is not only legal, but strongly encouraged in the US
Many outsiders, and critics, do not seem to realize that contracting out is 
not only legal in the US, but in fact strongly encouraged by laws and policies from 
President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) until the present. A 2008 Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report gives a sense of what is involved, and the extensive 
legal basis, for government contracting:
Sometimes called contracting out, “outsourcing” refers to an agency engaging 
a private firm to perform an agency function or provide a service. …Federal 
outsourcing policy is governed by the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 
and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-270). 
FAIR requires agencies to produce inventories of “commercial activities” 
– those that are not “inherently governmental” and able to be acquired from 
the private sector – that may be put up for competitive sourcing. OMB’s 
Circular A-76 provides agencies with specific directions for undertaking 
competitive sourcing.22
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 provides the 
legal basis for outsourcing.23 There is an extensive literature by practitioners on 
this topic, which conveys a sense of the extremely pro-privatization environment 
of the US government.24 There is a “dialogue of the deaf” on this issue. Social 
scientists, some journalists, and sectors of the general public see contracting out 
functions in national security and defense as anomalous, even somehow shady, 
whereas those within government view it as standard operating procedure. 
And, since almost one half of the DOD budget is currently contracted out, 
it indeed is. 
21 It is worth noting that the Brazilian lower house, the Câmara, approved a bill in January 2015 to outsource 
labor. See http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/215181-capital-sobe-trabalho-desce.shtml
22 Kosar, Kevin R. (2006) Contracting for Services (Outsourcing) in Privatization and the Federal Government: 
An Introduction Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, p. 15. 
23 Luckey, John R. (2003) OMB Circular A-76: Explanation and Discussion of the Recently Revised Federal 
Outsourcing Policy, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., updated 10 September 2003. 
24 See for example, Donahue, John D. (1989) The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means New 
York: Basic Books and Light, Paul C. (2008) A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service 
and How to Reverse It Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



























Awareness of problems in contracting out in recent conflicts
In the US the general issue of the use of public funds, and especially the 
utilization of contractors, became a very public and polemic issue which motivated 
the US Congress to not only hold hearings and pass laws to regulate the use 
of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also created organizations to focus 
specifically on the waste of very large sums of money. As noted above, the Congress 
created SIGIR, and despite efforts by the George W. Bush administration to shut 
it down, SIGIR continued until 2013 (when there were no more public funds 
to audit in Iraq). Between its creation in 2004 and its final Report in September 
2013, the SIGIR dealt with all imaginable topics surrounding the use of the 
US$ 60 billion of US funds allocated by the US Congress for the reconstruction 
of Iraq. The focus on contractors, including private security firms, was a central 
element of SIGIR’s work.25
Even more specifically regarding contracting out, in the face of scandals, 
fraud, and other problems, the U. S. Congress created in 2008 the Commission 
on War Time Contracting to examine contracting out in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In their final report Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing 
risks, of August 2011, the Commission stated that at least US$ 31 billion, and 
possibly as much as US$ 60 billion had been lost to contract waste and fraud in 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.26
Despite the widespread awareness of problems, and the current “sources 
sought” from the Army Contracting Command for contractors to go to Iraq, the 
problems continue. A recent official document puts it this way: “Congress and 
the executive branch have long been frustrated with waste, mismanagement, and 
fraud in defense acquisitions and have spent significant resources attempting to 
reform and improve the process. These frustrations have led to numerous efforts to 
improve defense acquisitions. Since the end of World War II, every Administration 
and virtually every Secretary of Defense has embarked on an acquisition reform 
effort. Yet despite these efforts, cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance 
shortfalls in acquisitions programs persist.”27 
25 The SIGIR Final Report to the United States Congress, dated September 9, 2013, is available at www.sigir.mil. 
Accessed January 14, 2015. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) still continues. 
26 The Final Report to Congress of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks dated August 2011 is available at www.
wartimecontracting.gov. Accessed January 14, 2015. 
27 Schwartz, Moshe (2014) Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress CRS 
Report, (R 43566), p. i. 
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Implications for National Security and Defense  
of contracting out security
The most recent Congressional Research Service Report on the topic of 
contracting out states, in the first sentences of the Introduction: “The Department 
of Defense (DOD) has long relied on contractors to provide the US military with a 
wide range of goods and services, including weapons, food, and operational support. 
Without contractor support, the United States would currently be unable to arm 
and field and effective fighting force.”28 As it is certain that contracting out national 
security and defense is here to stay, what, then, are some of the implications of 
this phenomenon? Utilizing our framework for analysis of civil-military relations 
and applying it to the PSCs, the results are displayed in Table 2.29
Table 1. Institutional dimensions of public and  




Monitoring and oversight 
by full spectrum of 
institutional mechanisms
Control exercised by full 




Problematic due to 
lack of strategy and 





Same as above Minimal control due 
to uncertain concept of 
inherently governmental 
functions and sketchy 
legal controls
Problematic due to lack 
of doctrine to include 
PSCs and absence or 
shortage of contracting 
officers and CORs
In reviewing these three dimensions—efficiency, control, and effectiveness—
with regard to the US may allow other countries to better prepare for contracting-
out than the US was and still is. 
Efficiency, which in my framework is essentially having functioning 
institutions to investigate and audit where resources go and how they are used, 
is not currently a problem with regard to the private security contractors. The 
federal institutions and mechanisms that carry out audit and investigation 
functions specifically to monitor the efficiency of PSCs are robust. Among many 
initiatives geared toward improving transparency in Iraq, Congress directed the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) to undertake extensive reporting, including 
28 Schwartz, Moshe and Wendy Ginsburg, and John F. Sargent Jr, (2015) Defense Acquisitions: How and Where 
DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars CRS Report, (R44010), p. 1.
29 This framework is explained and illustrated in Anonymous. 



























a “Congressional Oversight Manual;”30 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
to assess budgets and analyze the PSCs’ contracts; the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to study all relevant aspects of the contracting phenomenon; and 
most importantly and provocatively, kept SIGIR funded.31 
Control As the scope of contracting out expanded in Iraq, and scandals were 
made public by SIGIR, the media, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
there developed a sense that the PSCs had been allowed to expand their activities 
into what were previously considered “inherently governmental functions”. This 
concern was palpable in many personal interviews of the author with very senior 
policy-makers. The issue was raised publicly by members of the US Congress during 
the last months of 2008, where the ensuing political battle over the definition of 
inherently governmental exposed some of the different powers and funding sources 
of different sectors of the security contracting “industry”. 
That legislative debate, and the fact that the new administration coming 
into office on 20 January 2009 included not only President Barack Obama 
but also Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, both of whom had weighed in as 
senators in that debate on the side of tightening up the definition of “inherently 
governmental functions,” meant that the issue would continue to have a high 
profile. Consequently, in mid-2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
was tasked with delimiting inherently governmental functions, for which it held a 
public discussion in June. However, and important to understand concerning the 
politics of this issue, once contractors took on the missions that were previously 
inherently governmental, and developed supporters in government through the 
use of campaign funds and lobbyists, it was extremely difficult to turn the trend 
around. Proof of this point is that the most recent CRS report on Inherently 
Governmental Functions, of 23 December 2014, states boldly that there are two 
primary definitions of “inherently governmental functions” and in the four pages 
of tables at the end of the report demonstrates that there in fact four different 
definitions.32
If an area of governmental responsibility that originally was considered to 
be inherently governmental has been opened up to the PSCs, then what kind of 
control can be exerted to be sure they are acting in the best interests of the country? 
It is clearly not the robust set of institutions, oversight, and professional norms 
that apply to the uniformed military—they do not apply even to those contractors 
30 Kaiser, Frederick M. and Walter J. Oleszek, T.J. Halstead, Norton Rosenberg, and Todd B. Tatelman, 
(2007) Congressional Oversight Manual, CRS Report for Congress (RL 30240). The manual was updated, and 
republished on 19 December 2014. It is CRS RL30240. 
31 The GAO details their instruction to study PSCs in “MILITARY OPERATIONS. High-Level DOD Action 
Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting 
Deployed Forces,” Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees (GAO-07-
145), December 2006, updated from 2003: 3. 
32 Manuel, Kate M. (2014) Definitions of “Inherently Governmental Function” in Federal Procurement Law 
and Guidance, CRS Report for Congress; the tables are pp. 22-25.
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who carry out what seem to be military functions. Some experts, especially non-US 
sources, look to legal controls through enforcement of or modifications of existing 
law.33 While this appears promising in theory, in fact the legal basis for reigning 
in the PSCs is also problematic. 
The legal bases for regulating and controlling the PSCs are dealt with in 
studies by the CBO, CRS, GAO, and by contract law specialists in a number of 
publications. Even so, it is very difficult to determine the current legal status 
of contractors, including the PSCs. Under international law, contractors and 
other civilians working with the military are classified as civilian non-combatants. 
The application of international laws of armed conflict, including under the 1977 
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention on mercenaries, however, is ambiguous, 
according to this CRS report and others.34 
Under US law, “US contractor personnel and other US civilian employees 
in Iraq may be subject to prosecution in US courts. Additionally, persons who 
are “employed by or accompanying the armed forces” overseas may be prosecuted 
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA) or, in some 
cases, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).35 But even with this statutory 
authority, some contractors “might fall outside the jurisdiction of US criminal 
law, even though the United States is responsible for their conduct as a matter of 
state responsibility under international law and despite that such conduct might 
interfere with the ability of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq to carry out its US 
mandate.”36 
In interviews with Mr. Jeff Green, who had been Counsel to the Committee 
on Armed Services in the US House of Representatives and then President of his 
own lobbying firm and Doug Brooks, then President of the International Peace 
Operations Association (IPOA), in mid-June 2009, they concurred with this 
assessment. Brooks noted that while initially he and the members of IPOA were 
concerned with the SOFA, its implementation has worked out better than expected. 
The only thing that becomes apparent from these sources is that at present clear 
control is exercised over the PSCs neither by international law nor US law. Because 
the latter system is based on precedent, cases such as the Blackwater shootings in 
33 See for example, Alexandra, Andrew, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini, eds. (2008) Private Military 
and Security Companies: Ethics, policies and civil-military relations London and New York: Routledge; and 
more recently, Sheehy, Benedict, Jackson Maogoto, and Virginia Newell, (2009) Legal Control of the Private 
Military Corporation Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
34 For example, the Montreux Document of 17 September 2008 resulted from a meeting of seventeen countries 
regarding rules and good practices relating to private military and security companies operating in armed conflicts 
and relates to the Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and to the protection 
of victims of armed conflicts. The document “…contains a set of over 70 good practices designed to assist States 
in complying with these obligations. Neither parts are legally binding, nor are they intended to legitimize the use 
of PMSCs in any particular circumstance.” Summary of United Nations “General Assembly Security Council,” 
(A/63/467-S/2008/636), 6 October 2008.
35 Elsea, Jennifer K. Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura, (2008) p. 20.
36 Ibid. 



























Nisour Square in Bagdad on September 16, 2007 have to work their way through 
the appeals courts to reach some determination of how existing laws apply, and 
possibly to point the way toward additional legislation.37
Contracting firms are quick to argue that they are more effective than 
government agencies. And, since setting the bar with this comparison is extremely 
low, they may be right. However, one cannot look only at one contract but the 
overall situation of contracting out to understand their effectiveness. Based on 
research comparatively and in the US, we have developed a concept (within the 
framework displayed in Table 2), which we apply to the armed forces, the following 
three requirements for effectiveness: a plan, institutions to implement the plan, 
and adequate resources (financial and human) to reach the goal. 
Consequently, the first question to ask is, is there a plan that defines, 
coordinates, and implements a strategy for the use of contractors in support of 
military operations? Even if the combat commander in the field had a strategic 
vision of how to fight in the theater, as he must, he probably does not have control 
over the contactors operating in the theater, or have a way to include them in his 
strategic vision. As an August 2008 CBO report, states: 
Although military commanders can directly control the actions of military 
personnel and government civilians, their control over individual contractor 
personnel is less direct […]. In practice that authority [laws and regulations of 
the United States] enables the military commander to allocate the personnel 
under his or her command among any number of tasks those personnel are able 
and trained to do. The military commander may also request that additional 
personnel be reassigned from other parts of the government if necessary. 
By contrast, the duties of contractor personnel are set out in a fixed written 
contract […]. The military commander generally lacks the authority either to 
increase the scope (dollar value) of the contract or to change the contractor’s 
duties except in ways anticipated in the contract language. […] The military 
commander has less direct authority over the actions of contractor employees 
than over military or government civilian subordinates.38
Currently, there is no doctrine that compels integration of the contractors into 
a military commander’s strategy. Even once formulated, however, this doctrine will 
have to be adopted and implemented by the three separate services that individually 
have the authority to recruit, train, and equip the armed forces. Indeed there are 
now some indications of this awareness, but as it is a service responsibility, and 
it takes a VERY long time to formulate, let along implement, a doctrine. As of 
37 On October 22, 2014 a jury in the Federal District Court in Washington, D.C. found four former Blackwater 
private security guards guilty in the deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square in 2007. This was the first 
conviction of private security guards in the US court system. In April 2015 the four were sentences to terms 
ranging from 30 years to life imprisonment. 
38 “Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq,” CBO Paper, August 2008: 20.
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late 2011 the United States Army has published a doctrine, Operational Contract 
Support Planning and Management, signed by General Martin E. Dempsey, at 
that time Chief of Staff of the Army. It will, however, take some time before this 
doctrine is assimilated by the troops in the field, including the commanders.39
To be effective a security strategy requires institutions to implement it. What 
kinds of institutions are there, if any, to coordinate the contractors? The Gansler 
Commission Report, named for its chairman, The Honorable Jacques Gansler who 
was Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics during 
the Clinton Administration and who currently holds a named chair for Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland identifies problems with 
complexity, an insufficient focus on post-award contract management, inadequate 
organization and inadequate lines of responsibility to facilitate contracting.40 Under 
the heading, “Extremely Poor Interagency Operations,” the report finds that there 
is a lack of institutional orientation and functional inter-agency process in all of 
the areas listed above.41 The following quotes, from this section of the report, 
elaborate these points, rearranged slightly here to follow the line of my argument. 
In the Cold War environment, it was not envisioned there would be other 
Departments or Agencies engaged so much on the field of conflict. Today, the 
military commander who is supported by a “joint” contracting organization 
actually has a disparate group of well-meaning professionals sitting side-by-side 
applying different rules to the same situation […]. While it is recognized that 
the State Department, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, et al. bring impressive tool 
kits, which represent some of the most effective tools America has to offer and 
are critically essential to nation-building, in the Cold War era, these players only 
entered after the battlefield was relatively secure. They were not the integrated 
partners which successful expeditionary operations may require.42 
As the contractors are not under direct control of the commander, but are 
necessary for the success of his plan or strategy, the absence of coordination or 
an inter-agency process is especially important. All the sources I consulted, both 
written and in personal interviews, conclude that there is no overall plan or strategy 
within the DOD to integrate the contractors into an effective whole, nor is there 
an institutional mechanism to coordinate their work. The congressional staffers, 
academics, and GAO personnel interviewed all emphasized this critical weakness. 
The next question to ask is one regarding human resources (and not financial 
resources as the US poured money into the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan), 
39 US Army, “Operational Contract Support Planning and Management,” Army Regulation 715-9Washington, 
DC: Headquarters of the Army June 20, 2011. Available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r715_9.pdf
40 Gansler Commission Report “Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” report of the 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 31 October 2007.
41 Gansler Commission Report: 39 –46
42 Ibid.: 45-6



























and the question is what quantity and quality of personnel are in place to award 
and, even more important, oversee or monitor the contracts?43 This, however, is 
an institutional issue that is very difficult to remedy. The scope of the problem 
is daunting. The Gansler Commission report directly addresses the fact that the 
contract management workforce has not increased despite a seven-fold increase in 
the workload. 
In 1990, the Army had approximately 10,000 people in contracting. This was 
reduced to approximately 5,500, where it has remained relatively constant 
since 1996. […] yet both the number of contract actions (workload) and the 
dollar value of procurements (an indicator of complexity) have dramatically 
increased in the past decade while the contracting workforce has remained 
constant. The dollar value of Army contracts has increased 331 percent from 
US$ 23.3 billion in 1992 to US$ 100.6 billion in 2006, while the number of 
Army contract actions increased 654 percent from approximately 52,900 to 
398,700 over the same period.44
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of contract managers are civilians; 
out of a total of 5,800, there are only 279 military personnel doing this job.45 
This is extremely important as military personnel can be deployed much more 
easily than can civilians, and the report goes into some detail on why it is difficult 
to deploy civilians.46 It means that the contract managers were not in Iraq, or 
Afghanistan, but rather in the US. The background to this situation of few military 
contracting officers is found in the reduction of military forces at the end of the 
Cold War in the 1990s. While overall US Army forces, for example, were reduced 
32% from 732,000 in 1990 to 499,301 by 2003, the ranks of contracting officers 
were reduced 45% from 10,000 to 5,500, including the elimination of all flag and 
general officer positions during the same period.47 
43 According to Belasco, Amy (2014) The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 
Since 9/11, Congressional Research Report (RL33110), p. i. the total sum is $ 1.6 trillion of which $ 815 billion 
was for the war in Iraq. 
44 Gansler Commission Report: 30. See also Schwartz, Moshe (2008) Training the Military to Manage 
Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: Overview and Options for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 
p. 1, Figure 1. “However, while a number of contracting officers and other acquisition officials are in Iraq, most 
of DOD’s acquisition workforce is generally not deployed or embedded with the military during expeditionary 
operations. As the number of contactors in the area of operations has increased, the operational force – the service 
men and women in the field – increasingly rely on, interact with, and are responsible for managing contractors. 
Yet, a number of military commanders and service members have indicated they did not get adequate information 
regarding the extent of contractor support in Iraq and did not receive enough pre-deployment training to prepare 
them to manage or work with contractors.” Schwartz: 3. Schwartz draws heavily on Walker, David M. (2008) 
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve 
Management and Oversight, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives. (GAO-08-572T. 
45 Gansler 35, table 9. 
46 Ibid. 36-7.
47 Gansler Commission Report: 30. 
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Given this chronic shortage of personnel, who then oversees the fulfillment 
and completion of the contract? This is the contracting officer representative, 
or COR. 
There is agreement among sources on the lack of preparation for CORs, 
and the unreasonable multi-tasking expected of them. The Gansler Report is very 
critical of the CORs as an institutional mechanism for oversight. 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs), who are an essential part of 
contract management, are at best a “pick-up game” in-theater. CORs represent 
the “last tactical mile” of expeditionary contracting. However, CORs are 
assigned as contract managers/administrators as an “extra duty,” requiring no 
experience. A COR is often a young Soldier who does not have any experience 
as a COR. […] Although being a COR would ideally be a career-enhancing 
duty, the COR assignment is often used to send a young Soldier to the other 
side of the base when a commander does not want to have to deal with the 
person. Additionally, little, if any, training is provided. To further compound 
matters, generally all COR training is geared for a low-operations, low risk 
tempo, so it is barely adequate. Despite this, there are still too few CORs. 
Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract 
coverage.48 
In June 2003, GAO issued a comprehensive analysis of problems with 
DoD management and oversight of contactors that support deployed forces, 
and released a follow-on report to Congress in December 2006.49 In the 
updated report, William M. Solis, GAO’s director of Defense Capabilities and 
Management, noted that GAO began to report in 1997 on shortcomings in 
DoD’s management and training of contractor support to deployed forces, and 
took on the current study due to the increased use of contractors, and ongoing 
Congressional interest: “…GAO’s objective was to determine the extent to which 
DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting 
deployed force since our 2003 report.”50 This preface then lists four areas as 
examples of ongoing problems with contracting, all of which fall within the three 
analytical dimensions outlined above: planning, institutions, and resources. What 
is clear is that the problems identified in the report of June 2003 still applied in 
December 2006.51
The report also addresses persistent problems with insufficient resources 
to conduct oversight: 
48 Gansler Commission Report: 43.
49 Solis, William M. Director, (2006) Defense Capabilities and Management, “MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of 
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces” GAO report to Congress (GAO-07-145).
50 Ibid.: Highlights (no page number). 
51 Ibid: Highlights, Military Operations (no page numbers). 



























DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at 
deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that 
contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each 
location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract 
oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in 
more demanding contacting environments in deployed locations presents 
unique difficulties.52
Training is another aspect of the resource dimension: 
Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the use of 
contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or professional military 
education. The lack of training hinders the ability of military commanders to 
adequately plan for the use of contractor support and inhibits the ability of 
contract oversight personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed 
locations. Despite DOD’s concurrence with our previous recommendations 
to improve such training, we found no standard to ensure information about 
contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training.53
Although resources are the main issue in this observation, it also has 
implications for both planning and institution-building in that without training to 
manage and oversee the contractors, a commander and his staff cannot coordinate 
the contractors’ work with the command’s actual and evolving needs. 
All of the audits and studies that deal with DoD contracting practices come 
to the same conclusions. And, what applied during the war in Iraq is still the 
situation. At this point, contracting for services is still not included within a plan or 
strategy, there is no single responsible institution or inter-agency process to oversee 
either the awarding or fulfilling of contracts, and oversight personnel are lacking in 
both numbers and preparation. Currently, based upon the earlier huge reliance on 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan and the unrelenting negative publicity where 
Blackwater came to symbolize contracting out, the topic of contracting out as the 
US returns to Iraq is “toxic”. The problems have not been resolved, but rather 
swept under the carpet. 
Considerations for other countries 
Once contracting begins, and an industry emerges motivated by the 
profit motive, employing people, and engaging in lobbying and “strategic 
communications”, it will never go away. What was lacking in the US, and the effort 
since then has been to catch up, is a robust legal framework, a clear definition of 
52 Ibid: Military Operations (no page numbers).
53 Ibid: Military Operations (no page numbers).
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what can and, more importantly, cannot be contracted out, and a robust doctrine, 
with extensive training for all military personnel on how to deal with contractors. 
In the US all of these were initially missing, and it is only with great, and 
inconsistent, efforts that there is any progress at all in their being remedied. If a 
country can focus on these key requirements from the beginning, before contracting 
out is well established, then it will have a better chance of minimizing the negative 
aspects of contracting out. It must always be remembered there is a tension between 
two different mentalities or world views in that membership in the uniformed 
services is based on a sense of service and commitment, and PSCs are based on 
a profit-motive. This contrast can result in tensions in that there may be, and 
frequently are, armed personnel where one, working for a PSC, is being paid a salary 
that is three times greater than the uniformed soldier or officer. And, while the 
uniformed personnel are responsible for all and everything, the PSC is responsible 
for only what is included in the contract. This tension or contradiction can result 
in not only misunderstandings, but also recriminations and morale problems. 
Conclusion
Contracting out, including in security is well-established in the US. There 
are many causes and implications of contracting out. The logic of it makes sense, 
on the face of it, but as they say, “the devil is in the details”. As there are many 
causes or drivers, a simple decision, should one be forthcoming, to stop contracting 
out is impossible. Other countries must be aware of the possible negative 
implications prior to contracting out key roles and missions of their military 
forces. 
Bibliographic references
Avant, Deborah The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
 Bruneau, Thomas C. Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime 
Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks dated August 2011 is available at www.
wartimecontracting.gov.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) ‘Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq’ 
(Washington, D.C.: CBO, August 2008).
Dew, Nicholas and Bryan Hudgens, (2008) The Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey, 
21-22. Published in http://www.acquisitionresearch.org p. 9.
Dunigan, Molly Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.



























Gansler Commission Report ‘Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,’ 
report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, 31 October 2007.
Gates, Robert M. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 2014.
Light, Paul C. A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to 
Reverse It Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Luckey, John R., Valerie Bailey Grasso, and Kate M. Manuel, “Inherently Governmental 
Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for 
Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, (15 June 2009).
Manuel, Kate M. “Definitions of ‘Inherently Governmental Function’ in Federal Procurement 
Law and Guidance,” CRS Report for Congress, (23 December 2014).
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ‘National Defense Budget Estimated 
for FY 2013’ available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
fy2013/FY13_Green_Book.pdf
Organization of American States, Report on Citizen Security in the Americas 2012 Washington, 
DC: OAS Hemispheric Security Observatory (2012). 
Schwartz Moshe and Jennifer Church, “Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support 
Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress 
(17 May 2013).
Schwartz, Moshe “Summary” ‘Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis and Issues 
for Congress’ CRS Report for Congress (23 May 2014).
Schwartz, Moshe, Wendy Ginsberg, and John E. Sargent Jr., “Defense Acquisitions: How 
and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars. CRS Report for Congress (30 April 2015). 
Singer, Peter Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003. 
Solis, William M. Director, (2006) Defense Capabilities and Management, “MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with 
Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces” GAO report to 
Congress (GAO-07-145).
Stanger, Allison One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the 
Future of Foreign Policy New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System 2014 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: USD[AT&l], June 13, 
2014, 4. Available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/
SIGIR Final Report, Learning from Iraq, March 2013 available at www.sigir.mil
Walker, David M. Comptroller General of the United States, Before the Subcommittee on 
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-08-572T: 4-5. (2008).
Submitted on June 18, 2015




The United States has gone further than any country in the “privatization of security”. Other 
countries may find the economic or financial logic in the use of contractors persuasive. The US 
experience with contracting out security, particularly in Iraq, was problematic, and can serve as 
a cautionary tale in order that other countries might learn how to avoid the pitfalls.
Keywords: Iraq; privatization; security; USA.
Resumo
Os Estados Unidos foram mais longe que qualquer outro país na “privatização da segurança”. 
Outros países podem achar a lógica econômica ou financeira do uso de terceirizados persuasiva. 
A experiência dos EUA na terceirização da segurança, particularmente no Iraque, foi problemática, 
e pode servir como lição para que outros países aprendam a evitar as armadilhas.
Palavras-chave: Iraque; privatização; segurança; EUA. 
